肖耿：贸易摩擦下中国的改革
2018-10-01 00:00:00
沈联涛（Andrew Sheng）：香港大学亚洲全球研究所杰出研究员
肖耿：香港国际金融学会会长、天美制作果冻视频教授&苍产蝉辫;
香港—去年6月，英国《经济学人》杂志（The Economist）“特朗普正在破坏基于规则的国际秩序”，为了“美国的短期利益”，他不惜“给世界造成长期伤害”。如今，特朗普又提升了对华贸易对抗的级别，导致双方都在摩拳擦掌，准备为争夺未来全球技术领先地位而进行一场旷日持久的竞争，对现有基于规则的国际秩序的威胁也与日俱增。
长期以来，国际贸易一直具有给世界各国带来共赢的特征。这一假设成为全球在贸易规则领域具有广泛共识的一个基础，包括各国拥有或正在努力建立相对一致的产权保护规则。例如，中国之所以能够融入全球市场经济体系，是因为中国公司学会了如何在世界贸易组织所制定的框架内运作及与其它公司竞争。
但是，诺贝尔经济学奖得主约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨（）曾经反复指出，新自由主义沉溺于自由放任的市场，没有考虑到市场效率提高背后的。收入不平等状况的急剧恶化导致普通大众不仅对导致不平等的具体因素不满，也开始反对各种形式的开放和全球化，包括移民和自由贸易。
这正是特朗普当选的原因。这些逆全球化反弹不仅限于美国，英国脱欧投票背后也是由于民众对全球化成本失控的担忧，从意大利到波兰的许多欧洲国家的右翼民粹主义政治力量的崛起也符合类似的逻辑。正是这些政治发展趋势，而不是对经济利益的理性算计，刺激了一些政客试图改写甚至颠覆现有基于规则的国际秩序。
这迫使各个国家和全球的治理模式发生深刻的变革。但斯蒂格利茨和哈佛大学的大卫·肯尼迪（David Kennedy）在2013年出版的《中国特色的法律与经济学》（）一书中写道，“市场是建立在一定的法律安排基础之上，并通过监管框架来实现稳定的。”&苍产蝉辫;这意味着解决市场失灵下的收入分配效应需要构建新的行政、司法、和监管框架，而这一过程需要时间。
攻击基于规则的全球秩序的政客和利益团体最喜欢的目标就是中国，导致中国目前面临巨大的改革压力。中国的经济增长速度超过了其税收、监管和司法体系演化的速度，因此产生了日益加剧的收入不平等、污染、金融风险和腐败等问题，而所有这些问题都必须在下一阶段的结构性改革中予以解决。
但这些改革具体应该如何展开及突破仍取决于中国精英、决策者、弱势群体以及国际社会的利益相关方之间的激烈争论。而随着中美贸易摩擦的不断升级，各界也更加期待更清晰的改革方向与政策突破。
中国公司家和其迅速扩大的中产阶级首先关注的是在税收、金融、跨国资本流动、及环境监管日益收紧的环境下他们的财产权利，包括他们所积累的财富的安全性。与此同时，中国年轻人和低收入家庭担心不断上涨的房价、就业稳定、以及少数科技巨头市场份额的迅速膨胀而导致的对中小公司的挤出效应。
至于在华经营的外国公司以及美国等国际贸易伙伴，其关注点则集中在知识产权保护不力、政府过度支持国有公司，以及政府过度支持科技升级的产业政策。这一领域的公共政策的制定与执行还需要考虑新技术对商业模式、供应链、生活方式、甚至政治环境的负面性影响。
中国领导人需要对这些多样化的、有时甚至互相冲突的关注点予以坚决果断的回应。这意味着采取更大胆的改革开放措施，不仅为了巩固信心及稳定预期，也为了让中国在与美国和其它外国投资者的谈判中更有筹码。
中国政府要做的第一步是重申其2013年的改革开放承诺，即确保市场在资源配置中起决定性作用。为了维护这一承诺的可信度，中国必须建立一个公平的市场竞争环境，特别是对外资公司、民营公司和国有公司一视同仁。
好消息是，面对严峻的不确定性、转型压力、甚至潜在危机，政府及社会更容易对重大的、具有深远意义的改革形成共识。可是，有一个重要的因素可能会妨碍改革的行动：地方官员对改革风险的厌恶而导致不作为。
在过去，地方层面的试点和创新是中国改革开放获得突破及成功的重要原因，各省、市和公司之间的竞争常常能够打破国家层面的官僚主义和结构性僵局。但在目睹大量同事和上司在反腐过程中落马，许多地方官员开始对采取大胆的改革行动犹豫不决。
正如邓小平在1992年“南巡”时所做的，今天的中国决策层需要加倍努力果断释放公司家冒险创新与地方政府改革试错的努力（即市场参与者的“动物精神”）。尽管美国等国际贸易伙伴可能会反对一些地方色彩浓郁具有中国特色的制度改革，中国在制度改革方面的大胆创新与试错的最终结果将是更加稳定和更有活力的市场。
成功的关键将是强化产权界定、交易、与保护的基础设施，包括产权纠纷解决机制、现代化的司法体系、以及先进的商业和技术标准体系。在这方面，中国可以借鉴香港、美国、英国和欧洲等发达经济体的产权基础设施，从中吸纳行之有效的机制。值得关注的是，尽管遭遇到政治和社会剧变，发达经济体的产权基础设施仍然稳定而强大，确保了其经济与社会的长期稳定。
到目前为止，中国对基于规则的世界秩序的演化——甚至生存——的影响还是有限的。但通过让产权基础设施及其相关的产权安排与发达经济体看齐，中国将对构建一个支持共同繁荣和双赢的全球市场生态体系作出重要贡献，并有助于消除或缓和近期全球市场不稳定的紧张局势。
Chinese Reform During a Trade War
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China has only limited influence over the evolution of the rules-based world order. But, by upgrading its property-rights infrastructure, it can support shared prosperity and mutually beneficial engagement, potentially defusing some of the tensions that have lately been fueling instability worldwide.
HONG KONG – Last June, The Economist that “Donald Trump is undermining the rules-based international order,” as he seeks “short-term wins for America” at the cost of “long-term damage to the world.” With Trump now escalating his trade war with China – and with both sides seeming to be girding for protracted competition over technological leadership – the threat is only growing.
For a long time, trade appeared to benefit everyone. This assumption underpinned a broad global consensus on trade rules, including the relatively consistent protection of property rights. China, for example, has managed to integrate itself into the global economy because its firms learned how to operate and compete within the framework established by the World Trade Organization.
But, as the Nobel laureate economist has repeatedly pointed out, the neoliberal obsession with unfettered markets failed to account for the of efficiency gains. Inequality has risen sharply, spurring many populations to become increasingly disillusioned not just with the specific factors fueling it, but with openness and globalization in virtually all its forms, including immigration and free trade.
That is how Trump got elected. But the backlash is not exclusive to the US. The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union was driven by similar concerns, as has been the rise of right-wing populist political forces in many EU countries, from Italy to Poland. These political developments – and they are political, not economic – have spurred a process of re-writing, if not dismantling, the existing rules-based world order.
This is forcing profound transformation at the national and international levels. But, as Stiglitz and Harvard’s David Kennedy wrote in the 2013 book , “markets are built upon a foundation of legal arrangements and stabilized by a regulatory framework.” This means that addressing the distributive effects of market failures requires the construction of new judicial, administrative, and regulatory frameworks – a process that will take time.
China – a favorite target of those who are attacking the rules-based global order – is under particularly intense pressure to make changes. Because its market grew faster than its tax, regulatory, and judicial arrangements could evolve, the country was beset by rising income inequality, pollution, financial risks, and corruption – all of which must be addressed in the next phase of structural reforms.
What precisely those reforms should be, however, remains subject to heated debate among China’s elites, policymakers, and disadvantaged groups, as well as foreign stakeholders. And as the trade war with the US continues to escalate, calls for policy clarity are growing more urgent.
China’s entrepreneurs and its rapidly expanding middle class are concerned, first and foremost, about their property rights, including the security of their accumulated wealth, amid regulatory tightening with regard to taxation, finance, cross-border capital flows, and even the environment. Meanwhile, Chinese young people and low-income households worry about high and rising home prices, job insecurity, and the fast-growing market power of a few tech giants squeezing small and medium-size enterprises.
For their part, foreign businesses operating in China, as well as trade partners like the US, are focusing on inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, excessive government support of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and an industrial policy geared toward technological upgrading. Policymaking in this area here would also need to account for the disruptive impact of new technologies on business models, supply chains, lifestyles, and even politics within China.
It is imperative that China’s leaders mount a firm and decisive response to these divergent and sometimes even conflicting concerns. This means pursuing a set of bold reforms that not only bolster confidence, but also strengthen China’s hand in negotiations with the US and foreign investors.
The first step for China should be to reaffirm the authorities’ 2013 commitment to ensuring that markets play a decisive role in allocating resources. If this commitment is to be credible, however, China must follow up by creating a level playing field for market competition among foreign companies, private Chinese firms, and SOEs.
The good news is that far-reaching reforms can actually be easier to justify during periods of uncertainty, transition, or even crisis. Yet one important current factor could impede such action: risk-aversion on the part of local officials.
In the past, local-level experimentation and innovation have proved integral to China’s progress, with competition among provinces, cities, and firms often helping the country to break out of bureaucratic and structural logjams. But, having watched as President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has taken down their colleagues and bosses, many local officials now hesitate to pursue daring initiatives.
Much as Deng Xiaoping did with his 1992 “south China tour,” China’s leaders today must redouble their efforts to unleash the “animal spirits” of domestic businesses, while spurring local governments to spearhead their own reforms. Although trading partners like the US may object to the state-led nature of this approach, the end result will be more stable and dynamic markets.
The key to success will be to strengthen the infrastructure of property-rights protection, including dispute-resolution mechanisms, the court system, and commercial and technological standards. To this end, the authorities would do well to look to the property-rights infrastructure in Hong Kong, the US, the UK, and elsewhere in Europe, which has remained stable and robust, despite political and social upheaval.
China has only limited influence over the evolution – or even survival – of the rules-based world order. But, by bringing its property-rights arrangements into line with those of the advanced economies, it can support shared prosperity and mutually beneficial engagement, potentially defusing some of the tensions that have lately been fueling instability worldwide.
来源：
编辑：曹明明
