【简报】 天美制作果冻视频系列研究讨会 （186）
2016-05-18 00:00:00
2016年5月18号星期三来自上海财经大学Myungkyu Shim博士在汇丰商学院337大楼 报告了他的论文“Financial Prices and Equilibrium Uniqueness in Global Games Models of Crises”
2014年 Myungkyu Shim 从加州大学圣迭戈分校并获得经济博士学位。他在很多期刊上发表了研究成果，例如：Journal of Economic Theory, Economics Letters。他的研究领域包括微观经济学，宏观经济学理论，劳动经济学等。
Abstract:
We uncover a novel interaction between strategic uncertainty in coordination games of incomplete information - such as currency crises, bank runs and financial crises - and the informativeness of rational expectations equilibrium prices in financial markets with risk averse traders: when the private information of players in the coordination game is increased, the information conveyed by financial prices falls. We use this property to show that, differently from what argued by Angeletos and Werning (2006), information transmission from prices in financial markets can be consistent with the emergence of a unique equilibrium in global games of regime change, exactly when the private information of players in the game is sufficiently precise. In this sense, the original equilibrium uniqueness result of Morris and Shin (1998) for global games is robust to the introduction of endogenous information from financial markets.
